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Birdstrikes are a major hazard to aviation; costing millions of pounds a year in damage and delays, as
well as occasional hull losses and loss of life. The numbers and species of birds on and around airﬁelds
therefore need to be managed. To aid this process, airport staff often use risk assessments to identify
which bird species cause the greatest risk and use the outcome to target their bird control effort. To this
end, a number of national and international regulators, airports and other organisations recommend, or
use, a derivation of a risk assessment process ﬁrst published in 2006. This was developed using the UK
Civil Aviation Authority's birdstrike database, employing data collected between 1976 and 1996. The risk
assessment process relies on using the proportion of reported strikes that cause damage to the aircraft as
a proxy for the likely severity of the outcome of strike incidents, so any change in the relative level of
reporting of damaging and non-damaging strikes may signiﬁcantly bias the results. The implementation
of mandatory birdstrike reporting by the UK CAA in 2004 led to a signiﬁcant increase in the number of
strikes reported. If this involved a disproportionate increase in the number of non-damaging compared
to damaging incidents reported, it may have impacted on the accuracy of the risk assessment process.
This paper examines how differential reporting of damaging and non-damaging strikes can impact on
the risk assessment process. It shows that changes in reporting practices since the original risk assess-
ment was developed have impacted on the apparent birdstrike risk at UK airports, giving a false
impression of increasing risk over the period. It makes recommendations for how the process can be
better adapted to cope with such changes in the future, and how it should be modiﬁed for use in
countries with different reporting regimes to that in the UK.
Crown Copyright © 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the Open
Government License (OGL) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/
3/).1. Introduction
Collisions between aircraft and wildlife, mostly birds, (herein-
after referred to as birdstrikes) are a serious hazard to all forms of
aviation and have resulted in the loss of at least 108 aircraft and 276
lives in civil aviation (Thorpe, 2012). Less serious birdstrikes cause
signiﬁcant operational costs to the aviation industry as a result of
repairs to damaged aircraft, delays and cancellations, insurance
claims etc. The total cost to world commercial aviation has been
conservatively estimated at 1.5 billion US$ per year (Allan, 2002). In
order to manage these risks, the International Civil Aviation Orga-
nisation (ICAO) requires national aviation regulators to ensure then).
vier Ltd. This is an open access articimplementation of effective bird management policies on the air-
ﬁelds under their control via a number of Standards And Recom-
mended Practices (SARPS) (ICAO, 2012). The guidance material
provided by ICAO in support of these SARPS includes a recom-
mended risk assessment process to help aerodrome operators
target their bird management effort and resources at those species
that cause the greatest risk. This process derives from a paper
published in 2006 (Allan, 2006) which has subsequently been
adopted, with minor modiﬁcations, by International Birdstrike
Committee (IBSC, 2006) Airports Council International (ACI, 2013)
and a number of national regulators such as the UK Civil Aviation
Authority (CAA, 2014a).
Other birdstrike risk assessment techniques have also been
developed. Most of these employ a variety of ranking processes,
usually combining factors such as numbers of a particular speciesle under the Open Government License (OGL) (http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
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tion to aircraft ﬂight-paths, presence of single birds or ﬂocks, mass
of the species, tendency to be involved in strikes etc. The various
factors are combined mathematically and weighted to provide a
more or less real-time measure of risk that bird controllers can
immediately respond to (Allan, 2000; Shaw and McKee, 2008;
Soldatini et al., 2010; Yang et al., 2010, Zakrajsek and Bissonette,
2005). These techniques rely on regular and accurate data gath-
ering by bird control staff, who frequently have other duties to
perform leaving them unable to devote the time needed to ensure
that the necessary data are gathered with the accuracy required.
Although having the advantage of providing immediate tactical
advice concerning if and when birds need to be dispersed, they
have not generally found favour with regulators.
The process developed by Allan (2006) provides a longer term
strategic view of the risk levels at a particular airport. This, com-
bined with a ‘live risk register’ (a real-time dynamic assessment of
immediate risks), provides both strategic and tactical guidance for
bird control staff and resource managers. Allan's process relies on
combining, an estimation of the probability of a strike occurring
with a particular bird species (using the airports strike record over
the past ﬁve years) with an estimation of the likely severity of the
outcome of the strike incident (using the proportion of strikes with
that species resulting in aircraft damage). The data used came from
the UK Civil Aviation authority's birdstrike database for those
strikes reported over the period 1976e1996.
Since 1996, the number of strikes reported at most UK airports
each year has risen, with markedly more strikes reported following
the UK CAA's mandating of birdstrike reporting in 2004 (see
Table 3). If this represents a real increase in strike numbers, the
number of damaging and non-damaging strikes would be expected
to rise by a similar proportion and the proportion of strikes
resulting in damage would remain the same. Other studies pro-
duced before the introduction of mandatory reporting have shown
that strikes that damage an aircraft were more likely to be reported
than non-damaging ones (Linnell et al., 1999; Milsom and Horton,
1995). An unintended consequence of mandatory reporting could,Table 1
Showing the category boundaries for the probability and severity measures used to posi
(a) Probability categories
5-year rolling mean of no. of strikes per year for each species (airport data) >
Probability category V
(b) Severity categories
Percentage of strikes with a species causing damage (national data) >
Severity category V
Table 2
The risk assessment matrix developed by Allan (2006) showing the three levels of respons
its probability and severity categories.therefore be the more frequent reporting of previously unreported
non-damaging strikes. If this is the case the number of non-
damaging strikes reported should increase by a greater propor-
tion than the number of damaging strikes. This would reduce the
proportion of strikes causing damage for a particular species,
which, in turn, would balance the increase in overall strike
numbers, thus giving no overall increase in risk. If the proportion of
strikes causing damage is not recalculated, as has been the case in
the UK, the same change in reporting behaviour would give a false
impression of increasing risk.
This paper assesses whether the increase in reported strikes at
UK airports has involved a differential increase in the numbers of
non-damaging strikes reported, and whether these changes in
reporting practices have impacted on the risk assessment process
at UK airports. It then determines whether the methodology needs
to be adjusted to ensure that the risk assessment outcomes remain
valid, both for use in the UK and in other countries where reporting
regimes may differ from those on which the technique was origi-
nally based.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Detailed description of the current birdstrike risk assessment
methodology
Table 1 shows the risk assessment matrix published by Allan
(2006). The probability categories are based on a 5 year rolling
mean of the number of strikes reported per year with a particular
bird species at the airport being risk-assessed. The severity cate-
gories are based on national data combining all strikes for the spe-
cies concerned and determining the proportion of those strikes that
resulted in damage to the aircraft involved. There is a problemwhen
calculating the severity measure for rarely struck bird species
because the proportion of strikes resulting in damage varied widely
due to random chance. In order to control this variation, a linear
regression of proportion of strikes causing damage against mass,
weighted according to the number of strikes recorded for eachtion bird species in the risk assessment matrix (after Allan (2006)).
10 3e10 1e2.9 0.3e0.9 0e0.2
ery high High Moderate Low Very low
20% 10e20% 6e9.9% 2e5.9% 0e1.9%
ery high High Moderate Low Very low
e required from the airport depending on the position of each bird species deﬁned by
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species struck more than 5 times during the period in question.
Assuming that different bird species of similar mass caused similar
damage, the proportion of strikes resulting in damage (i.e. the
measure of severity in the matrix) could then be read directly from
the graph for any species for which the body mass was known. Re-
examination of the data shows that the ﬁt of the data to the linear
regression model is poor, with high residual values (i.e. a poor ﬁt to
the line). It was not possible, however, to ﬁnd an alternative,
more complex, model that provided a good ﬁt to the data. Because
any risk assessment model needs to be easy to use and under-
standable by the airport staff involved, and because Allan (2006)
used a simple weighted linear regression in the original methodol-
ogy, this paper has kept to the same process for the purposes of this
re-evaluation.
Once the probability and severity ﬁgures for a particular species
are determined for the airport being risk assessed, they are placed
in one of 5 categories: very low, low, moderate, high and very high
(see Table 1) which allows each species to be placed within a
particular box in a risk matrix of a type commonly used in a variety
of risk assessment processes (see Table 2). The matrix is divided
into ‘accept’, ‘review’ and ‘action’ categories, and the airport then
develops an action plan to manage species that fall into the
different categories. Most airports focus their bird control effort on
those species that fall into the ‘action’ category.3. Calculation
3.1. Determining if the number of strikes and the proportion of
damaging strikes reported has changed over time
Data from 1976 to 1996, the ﬁnal 7 years of the period used by
Allan (2006), is still available for analysis. This can be compared
with the following 8 years (1997e2004) duringwhich the reporting
requirements were similar, and for the 9 years after the mandating
of birdstrike reporting in 2004 (2005e2013). Table 3 below shows
the overall total and number per year of all conﬁrmed strikes
identiﬁed to species and all damaging strikes identiﬁed to species
that were reported during these three time periods.
The data show that between 1990e96 and 1997e2004 the total
number of conﬁrmed strikes identiﬁed to species per yearTable 3
The total number and number per year of strikes identiﬁed to species in the three time
Total conﬁrmed
strikes identiﬁed
to species
Number of conﬁrmed
strikes identiﬁed to
species per year
Total n
damagi
identiﬁed
All years 13582 565.92 4
1990e1996 2256 322.29 1
1997e2004 3581 447.62 1
2005e2013 7745 860.56 1
Table 4
UK Air Trafﬁc Movement (ATM) Rates 1990 to 2013.
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
ATM (millions) 3.22 2.88 2.82 2.83 2.95
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ATM (millions) 3.60 3.46 3.61 3.67 3.80increased by 39 percent, whilst the number of damaging strikes
reported per year fell by 14 percent. The proportion of strikes
resulting in damage fell from 6% to 3.7% over the same period.
Between 1997-2004 and 2005e2013 (i.e. comparing the periods
before and after reporting was made mandatory) the total number
of reported strikes per year identiﬁed to species rose by 92% and
damaging strikes identiﬁed to species per year rose by 21%. The
proportion of strikes causing damage fell from 3.7% to 2.3% over the
same period.
It is possible that the increase in total reported strikes identiﬁed
to species shown in Table 3 occurred due to factors other than
reporting behaviour. Themost obvious of thesemight be changes in
aircraft movement rates with increasing number of ﬂights leading
to an increased number of birdstrike incidents. Table 4 below shows
the UK aircraft movement rate data for the period 1990 to 2013
(CAA, 2014b).
The data in Tables 3 and 4 and Fig. 1 above, show that a 92%
increase in the number of reported strikes identiﬁed to species
occurred after mandating of reporting in 2004 and that this cannot
be explained by a change in the number of air transport movements
over the same period. The number of damaging strikes reported
also increased (by 21%) over the same period, suggesting that
mandating of reporting has resulted in a disproportionate increase
in the reporting of non-damaging strikes. This has resulted in the
proportion of strikes causing damage falling from 3.7% to 2.3%. This
shows that the severity measure in the risk assessment (the pro-
portion of strikes causing damage for each species) needs to be
recalculated in order to avoid the risk being over-estimated
following the increase in reported strikes that occurred after
mandating of reporting in 2004.3.2. Recalculation of the proportion of strikes causing damage
The predictive graph for the proportion of strikes causing
damage was recalculated using the same method as used by Allan
(2006) for each of the three periods (Fig. 2). The gradient of the line
in the three time periods decreases, showing that in the later time
periods the proportion of reported strikes causing damage to
aircraft for a bird species of given mass is reduced. There is still
considerable scatter around the line for all periods, and the ﬁt of the
model after 2004 was particularly poor (R2 ¼ 0.288).periods.
umber of
ng strikes
to species
Number of damaging
strikes identiﬁed to
species per year
Proportion of strikes identiﬁed
to species resulting in
damage (%)
53 18.88 3.3%
36 19.43 6.0%
34 16.75 3.7%
83 20.33 2.3%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
3.10 3.10 3.24 3.39 3.38 3.39 3.39
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
3.78 3.80 3.67 3.38 3.11 3.12 3.03
Fig. 1. The number of damaging and non-damaging strikes identiﬁed to species per million air trafﬁc movements (ATM) in each year. The vertical dotted line represents when
mandatory reporting was introduced in 2004.
Fig. 2. Linear regression, weighted by the number of strikes per species, of species mass against the proportion of reported strikes causing damage to an aircraft for the three time
periods. Species struck more than 5 times are included in the analysis.
J. Allan et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 57 (2016) 101e106104In an effort to improve ﬁt of the relationship, the analysis
was repeated including only species struck more than 100 times
in the whole period. This change had relatively little impact on
the relationship in 1990e96 or 1997e2004, but greatly
improved the ﬁt of the model in the 2005e13 period, increasingthe R2 value from 0.28 to 0.87. Fig. 3 shows the graphical rep-
resentation of the relationship between mass and proportion of
strikes causing damage calculated using species with more than
100 strikes recorded in each period. The number of outliers is
reduced.
Fig. 3. Linear regression, weighted by the number of strikes per species, of species mass against the proportion of reported strikes causing damage to an aircraft for the three time
periods using only bird species struck more than 100 times during the period concerned.
Table 5
The number of species that changed their risk category between the three time periods considered when the proportion of strikes causing damage from Allan (2006) was
applied and when the proportion of strikes causing damagewas adjusted to take account of changes in reporting rates, either using species struck more than 5 times or species
struck more than 100 times as a cut-off for inclusion in the calculation.
Number of Species Increasing In Risk Category Number of Species Decreasing In Risk Category
Severity Measure Not Adjusted 28 7
Severity Measure Adjusted using species struck more than 5 times 7 31
Severity Measure Adjusted using species struck more than 100 times 11 22
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between mass and proportion of strikes causing damage on the risk
assessment outcome
In order to assess whether re-calculating the proportion of
strikes causing damage over the three periods changes the outcome
of the risk assessment process, the risk assessment matrices for the
20 most commonly struck bird species for the ﬁve UK aerodromes
with the greatest number of reported birdstrikes between 1990 and
2013 were calculated. The position of each bird species on the air-
port's matrix in the three time periods being considered was ﬁrst
calculated using the proportion of damaging strikes from 1976 to
96 calculated by Allan (2006) without any adjustment made for
changes in reporting rates that have occurred in subsequent years.
The data for 1997e2004 and 2005e13 were then re-calculated
using the proportion of damaging strikes speciﬁc to the period
concerned.
Table 5 shows the number of species that changed in risk
category (i.e. moved from ‘accept’ to ‘review’ or ‘review’ to ‘action’
or vice versa) between the three time periods when the proportion
of damaging strikes used by Allan (2006) was not adjusted (the
current situation) and when the proportion of damaging strikes
was re-calculated for the time period concerned. The analysis was
repeated using 5 strikes (Fig. 2) or 100 strikes (Fig. 3) in each period
as a cut-off for including a species in the calculation of the rela-
tionship between mass and proportion of strikes causing damage.The data show a clear difference, with far more species increasing
in risk category if the proportion of strikes causing damage is not
adjusted and more decreasing in risk category if it is recalculated.
The difference between the numbers increasing and decreasing in
category is less marked when 100 strikes per species is used as a
criterion for inclusion in the calculation thanwhen 5 strikes is used.
4. Discussion
The analysis presented here shows that the outcome of the risk
assessment protocol developed by Allan (2006) is susceptible to
variation depending on the levels of reporting efﬁciency that exist
at the airport or in the country involved. The broadly static
numbers of damaging strikes recorded in the UK over the 23 years
for which data are now available suggest that overall national risk
levels have not changed greatly.
Increasing rates of reported non-damaging birdstrikes between
1990e96 and 1997e2004 cannot be explained by increasing
numbers of air transport movements, and the fact that the number
of reported damaging strikes fell over the same period suggests
that the overall risk at UK aerodromes fell between the two periods.
However, because the proportion of damaging strikes used in the
risk assessment process has not been recalculated, the increasing
number of non-damaging strikes reported has given a false
impression of an increase in overall birdstrike risk in that period.
Themandating of birdstrike reporting in 2004 resulted in a large
J. Allan et al. / Journal of Air Transport Management 57 (2016) 101e106106increase in the total number of reported birdstrikes that cannot be
explained by changes in air transport movements. There was a
corresponding, but smaller, increase in the number of damaging
birdstrike reports, but overall the proportion of damaging bird-
strikes fell. Because this proportion has not been recalculated, a
number of bird species have risen in risk category at the UK's main
airports primarily as a result of increased reporting rates for non-
damaging strikes rather than any actual increase in risk. There is
clearly a need to recalculate the proportion of damaging strikes for
use on UK airports in order to avoid airport managers investing
scarce resources in managing risks unnecessarily.
The sensitivity of this risk assessment process to reporting
culture means that care also needs to be taken when applying this
method around the world. Individual countries have different
reporting requirements in their regulations, and from personal
experience at hundreds of airports around the world, the authors
are aware that these regulations are applied with very different
levels of rigour when the reporting of birdstrikes is concerned. It is
therefore most important that individual countries undertake a
calculation of the relationship between bird mass and percent
damage using their own data, rather than relying on data collected
from other countries where reporting behaviour may be signiﬁ-
cantly different. Similarly, where any country's reporting regula-
tions change, or where there is reason to assume that reporting
behaviour may have changed for other reasons (e.g. a publicity
campaign or pressure from safety auditors to improve reporting of
strikes), the proportion of damaging strikes should be re-calculated
to allow for the impact of changes in reporting behaviour that may
otherwise give a false impression of the true level of risk.
The poor ﬁt of the data to the simple linear regression model
used by Allan (2006) poses further problems. The low number of
strikes recorded for some species make a simple percent damaging
strikes measure prone to ﬂuctuation caused by random chance.
Examination of the residual variation suggests that the true rela-
tionship between mass and proportion of damaging strikes is not
simply linear. Nevertheless, the risk assessment methodology has
worked well in practice since its publication, and, at present, we
recommend continuing with this technique in the future, but
revising the calculation of mass vs. proportion of damaging strikes
as needed to allow for changes in reporting rates. We would also
encourage the use of the largest possible sample size when
deciding whether or not to include a species in the calculation. The
choice of sample size will inevitably be a trade-off between having
enough species included in the analysis to make it meaningful and
having a statistically valid relationship not unduly inﬂuenced by
outliers. This, in turn, will depend on the numbers of strikes in the
available national dataset that are both reported and identiﬁed to
species. Alternatively, more complex methods could be used to
model the relationship between damage and bird mass, however
this requires an understanding of factors such as how reporting
effort varies between aerodromes, which is not currently available.
5. Conclusion
The risk assessment developed by Allan (2006) has proved a
very useful tool in practice and it, or derivatives of it, have been
adopted by a large number of regulators and airport operators
around the world. This analysis shows that the methodology is
susceptible to changes in reporting efﬁciency within a country or
differences in reporting culture between countries. In the UK, for
example, the current recommendation is to use the relationship
between mass and proportion of strikes causing damage calculatedby Allan (2006) which uses the data from 1976 to 1996 and includes
species struck at least 5 times. This line has a slope of 0.014, so in
practice onewouldmultiply the mass in grams of a species by 0.014
to obtain the proportion of damaging strikes for that species and
hence a strike severity measure for use in the risk assessment. The
increase in reporting frequency since the mandating of strike
reporting in 2004 means that the recalculated slope of the line,
using species struck more than 100 times to improve the ﬁt, is now
0.003 (the line shown for 2005e2013 in Fig. 3). Failing to apply this
recalculation is in parallel to the increase in reporting of non-
damaging strikes following mandating of strike reporting is
resulting in a substantial over-estimation of the risk at individual
aerodromes in the UK. We therefore recommend the new rela-
tionship betweenmass and proportion of strikes causing damage is
applied in the UK with immediate effect and that individual
countries calculate the relationship between mass and proportion
of strikes causing damage using their own data. Routine recalcu-
lation of the relationship should be undertaken at least every 5
years, or more frequently if there is reason to believe that a change
in reporting practices may have occurred. Further studies to
develop a better understanding of the relationship between bird
mass and the number of reported damaging strikes could help to
make the risk assessment more statistically robust.Acknowledgements
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